Generative art: a question of aesthetic,
knowledge and interfaces
Communications
Program,Universidad de Lima, Lima, Perú
e-mail:
pichon2@bonus.com.pe.
Generative art is a concoction of algorithmic interactive
processes, artists, users, and computers. This context generates new hybrid forms: art becomes
a sort of an algorithm, and code evolves into autonomous poetic text. Artists
should, due to the great social impact of this media, build new criteria to
legitimate their work.
It is an aesthetic that can boost or inhibit the artistic potential of
generative processes: we need art as an open, interactive and generative work,
where the process itself is aesthetically significant. Thus, we should
reconsider beauty in the context of knowledge and hermeneutics. But theoretic
questions are pointless if we don’t analyze what happens to art in a digital
environment: this means to be able to deal with the problem of interaction.
My goal is to study when we can speak of meaningful interactive art
processes and under which conditions software improves cultural practice. I see
three problems: what we seek in art, what is interaction, and what is the
cultural identity of software. I will try to demonstrate that the key factor is
knowledge, which can ultimately affect the meaning of generative art itself.
This implies the redefinition of what software does (it must assume its
responsibility as a communication and cultural system) and how software
communicates with users. This questions the role of interfaces: these should be
redefined by hermeneutics and artistic means, and should not be imprisoned
inside hi tech gadgets and special effects.
Introduction
It is probably a risk to speak
of generative artistic processes as an interactive grouping made up of artists,
an audience, systems capable of some form of self organization and computers.
Philip Galanter[1] has justly pointed out that the aesthetic of generative art
are somewhat diffused and that it does not necessarily need digital technology
to be considered truly generative. However, computers do offer the development
of generative art its most adequate medium, as they allow, for example, an
efficient use of mathematical simulations of diverse natural processes. For
this reason I will refer to generative art as essentially digital. If we accept
this view point, generative art is a context which produces new media, creative
and communicational processes. Still in its infancy, and relatively unknown, it
will have great cultural and social impact, for example in education. This
impact is due to the ubiquitous diffusion of computers, Internet, information
highways and so on. For all these reasons, these new art forms need to lay down
their foundations in a way that the social and cultural aspects, implicit in their
processes and languages, are taken into consideration.
My personal experience has led
me to conclude that this impact is particularly relevant in the countries of
the third world, which act as fragile stages to the effects of cultural and
technological globalization. In such environments the strengths of digital
technologies are perceived as a new form of colonization, which becomes
increasingly dangerous as it becomes more complex and sophisticated.
Something else we cannot
ignore is the cultural context in which these new art and communications forms
operate in. This context, let us call it postmodern, is characterized by the
relativity of values and criteria, thus creating an unstable scenario from
which to develop a constructive and responsible critique. Additionally, we must
not forget that there still exists a significant fracture between the
scientific and humanist cultures; the growing scientific know how in
technological arts has made the traditional tools of criticism become rapidly
obsolete. We can safely say that the new artistic and technological languages
produce extreme reactions with self-defeating effects.
Simplifying matters, these
attitudes can be synthesized in the digital enthusiasm of the Negroponte[2]
school and in the apocalyptic visions of Baudrillard’s[3] mediatic criticism. A
blind faith in technology does permit significant creative achievements,
however when geared by economic strategies, it can also be limiting in
developing effective social and cultural uses or it can risk falling prey of
the technological funfair. Furthermore, Baudrillard’s "perfect crime
theory" which alerts us about the dissolution of reality in simulations,
does not offer the tools for constructive criticisms.
I would like to stress
therefore that it is essential to raise the questions of sustaining and the
ends of any generative work. This is both an aesthetic and philosophical
dilemma and it consists of defining the relationships between aesthetic
thought, scientific knowledge and technology.
In an underdeveloped context,
full of cultural and social contradictions, the dynamics between art, science
and technology present characteristics which are probably hidden or absent in
more advanced cultural and economic situations. Between both worlds, the
concept of knowledge becomes critically important.
Under this umbrella, I feel
the priority is not so much being able to state what is a generative process,
but when, and under which conditions, digital art constitutes a significant
artistic experience.
Technological and aesthetic
factors determine these conditions, especially those related to software and
interfaces. I will try to demonstrate that both elements are structurally
intertwined, and that the way this fusion is presented will determine the
purpose of an artistic digital experience such as generative art.
My intention is not to present
an academic lecture, but to share my experiences and philosophical journeys
through the fields of art and teaching. These reflections pretend to be totally
flexible, as the new territories we are exploring are completely open. Finally,
the limitations presented by space force me to be synthetic when explaining
problems and I want to apologize for eventual difficulties and confusions. I
hope these arise from the complexity of the situation and not from my inability
to explain them.
The aesthetic
problem
Generative
art, and in general all art which relies on software for its construction, is
mainly perceived as a technological innovation because of its links to
scientific concepts and procedures. For this reason, the aesthetic question is
not addressed in most cases and is left to the freedom of individual tastes.
This omission, however, ends up sapping the innovative strength of digital
artistic processes, as a contradiction is generated between the possibilities
of digital media and the weaknesses of its aesthetics. In other words, the risk
is to confine the digital arts inside artistic mechanisms which are openly in
crisis as regards their theoretical and institutional realities.
This risk
exists because the freedom of "taste" is only apparent as the
aesthetic issue reappears dogmatically at an individual level in open
contradiction with the pluralist ideals of postmodernism.
There are
two reasons which I believe make this happen: the first has to do with
technology as we will see later on, the second has to do with the difficulty of
managing the relationship between personal issues and the inherent postmodern
nihilism. Artistic practice then, endures an internal conflict between the
acceptance of a "no rules" situation and individual need of a strong
artistic paradigm.
The
absence of well defined aesthetic thinking does create a vacuum, a kind of
black hole which engulfs mass cultural stereotypes or the cultural inheritance
of common sense or of the education one received. If we do not question these,
fundamentally romantic and modernist aesthetic inheritances, if we do not
identify and confront them, they will annul the innovative possibilities
present in technological, digital or generative art.
In Latin
America, these inheritances are still present at the root of all educational
systems, so new curricula which is opening up to new technologies is limited by
obsolete concepts.
The
initial proposal therefore consists of identifying obsolete theoretical
preconceptions which are still found in postmodern art and which, in many
instances, prevent it from evolving out of the endemic crisis which
characterizes it. Such preconceptions continue to circulate freely because the
postmodern system is incapable or does not want to change them. The phenomenon
is not new; art systems have traditionally generated resistance to structural
changes. Photography for example, had to divorce itself from its links with
painting in order to find expressive and linguistic autonomy. Similarly, I
believe that the digital arts must become independent and that implies the
questioning of the reality which still makes up their operative scope. In order
to achieve this we have at our disposal abundant philosophical tools; so what I
will do is present a short review of some of the aesthetic issues, so that I
can share with you this attempt to see things from a different perspective.
Arthur Danto and the death of
art
The
crisis of contemporary art, which is the crisis of modernist art or the
phenomenon of the death of art, coincides with the appearance of the concept of
liberty in art and with the philosophic roots of postmodernism. Danto[4]
tackles the issue from a philosophical and artistic perspective; we can agree
or disagree with his analysis, but it does offer useful indications to identify
subsequent analytic elements.
For
Danto, the phenomenon of the death of art has ancient origins. Plato’s mistrust
of the Hegelian esthetic could be a starting point. However, the key
theoretical concept of this process is the idea of art for art’s sake, product
of the Kantian ideal of esthetics of genius: in the first place art is given an
autonomous value and it is proposed as a privileged sphere among human
intellectual activity; secondly, the utopia of liberty in art ends up
generating a self referential mechanism which in turn transforms art in an
object of itself. The culminating historical moment of this process coincides
with two specific events: the invention of photography, which sums up the
history of representational function in art and Duchamp’s “Ready Made”. Danto
tells us that with the “Ready Made”, art becomes aesthetics, thinking of itself
as philosophy. In this sense we see modernism as the belief that allows us to
understand the essence of art: that is why modernism covers the period of the
avant garde. The modernist hypothesis which states that art progresses, enters
in crisis with the arrival of nihilist postmodern thinking: among the chaos of
what is possible, the questioning of the concept of progress, the debate
of ‘new’ as an absolute value, the
avant garde loses any authority as a revolutionary artistic theory and a whole
system enters into crisis. Within the mechanism of art for art’s sakes however,
artist remain protected from any criticism and art begins to play with anything
and tackle any subject without consequences. But Danto concludes that these
phenomena can be reduced to survival strategies and to systems generated by the
market place.
Benjamin and the mechanical
reproduction of art
The general presentation of
the crisis in art that we have just seen provides us with a starting point to
analyze the technological aspect with greater precision. For Danto it is
technology, (in particular photography) and technical reproducibility, together
with the “Ready Made” the two factors which trigger the process of the end of
art.
Technical reproducibility and
the concept of aura are at the centre of Benjamin’s[5] criticism of art for
art’s sake. Benjamin believes that the aura houses the concept of creativity,
the concept of genius and of art’s eternal value all typical of the aesthetic
of art for art’s sake. The aura depends essentially on the historical and
social contexts of the work of art. This context defines the creator and the
conditions under which the work of art was executed, as well as the work’s
physical dependence to a given space or geographical situation. Benjamin calls
these contexts the “hic et nunc” of the work of art; it is the specifics of
each “hic et nunc’s” which gives the work of art its authenticity, its unity or
in conclusion, its aura.
Benjamin says that technical
reproducibility has the positive effect of taking away the aura from the work
of art. Taking into consideration Benjamin’s ideological background (a Marxist
and an anti fascist), mass media can transform the work of art into a
democratic and revolutionary instrument. However and contrary to Benjamin’s
expectations, the aura (and the Kantian esthetic or art for art’s sake) has
been recovered by the cultural industry as a new form of genius: “the star”.
This simulated aura has been artificially generated by the “star system” for
essentially commercial purposes. It has transformed mass media, like the
cinema, into powerful instruments of ideological manipulation and of the
organization of consensuses around consumerist economics. It is fascinating to
see how this mechanism has come into being and due to which factors. We can
find these factors in Gadamer’s[6] analysis which is built around the criticism
of the Kantian concept of genius and the rescue of the epistemological value of
art.
Gadamer and the critical
approach to genius
Gadamer’s criticism of the
Kantian concept of genius points to the boundaries of subjective autonomy in
the creative act, typical of the idea of the artistic genius. This thesis
implies, and this is where we find the criticism, the existing dislocation
between art and reality as well as its irresponsible attitudes relating to
ethics and epistemological questions. Gadamer believes that art must be
recovered as a true process of knowledge. This aspect is particularly important
as it is seen as the initial step towards a general recovery of human sciences,
at a time when methodical scientific thought is regarded as the absolute
triumph.
Comparing art with the
phenomenon of play, Gadamer evidently presents the ontological process which
the work of art brings to the artist as well as the spectator. This
transformation is determined by the encounter with truth (in the hermeneutic
and post metaphysical sense); the work of art therefore, manifests itself as a
superior context which includes in its processes the artist and the spectator
as participants. This idea strongly suggests two concepts which in a way bring us
to the evaluation of digital works of art.
The first concept refers to
the special relationship as regards ends and objectives generated in games and
players (terms we can substitute with work of art, artist and spectator). In
the first place, according to Gadamer, we must agree that the objective of a
game is the game itself, as long as it is an ontological transformation and an
encounter with truth. However if a player interferes with this process and
introduces his personal interests, then the process becomes contaminated. The
experience of the game becomes false and its content of truth is lost.
The second aspect refers to
the concept of risk, which is inherent to the game and which implies
recognizing the role of identity in whatever elements the players bring to
discussion in the game. We can read this identity as the “hic et nunc” Benjamin
talks about. We can say that, so that the game develops its “ontological
increment” (the transformation of identity through the contact with the truth),
the “hic et nuncs” are essential. Gadamer says that if a player does not want
to risk his identity, he is then forced to wear a mask and introduce falseness
and deceit to the game.
Finally, the problem of the
aura is presented yet again, but if we see it in Gadamer’s terms, the aura does
not only depend on the individual “hic et nuncs” (from the work of art, the
artist or spectator), but on the process of ontological transformation which
includes all. Contrary to art for art’s sake and the aesthetics of the genius, Gadamer
considers the artistic phenomenon as a hermeneutic process of the
interpretation of truth.
Heidegger: art and truth
We can clarify the mechanism
which allows the work of art to fulfill its hermeneutical function looking at
some aspects of Heidegger’s esthetic thought upon which Gadamer bases his
theoretic structure.
Heidegger presents the work of
art as the process which manifests or puts into gear the concept of truth in a
conference about sculpture. As Vattimo[7] says in the introduction to this short
text, Heidegger compares the manifestation of truth with “making space”. To
understand the importance of this spatial metaphor, we must consider the
radical difference with which the concept of truth is treated in Heidegger’s
philosophy. It would be a mistake to think of this truth with old metaphysical,
universality and eternity criteria. The truth as it is understood by Heidegger,
post metaphysic, does not imply the exact relationship between the
preconception and data according to the principles of empiric verification of
scientific thought. It is proposed as an undetermined horizon, which involves
individual truths: these are made up of personal criteria such as true and
false. It also implies the relationship with the array of historical and social
circumstances (in other words they are the “hic et nuncs”). These individual
aspects are presented like openings, always different, inside and towards the
horizons of truth. It is for this reason that the main significance of the work
of art is the finding of new spaces and new manifestations of truth. This
inauguration is the result of the work of art’s own space (as an individual
truth which Heidegger calls “locality”) and the projection towards the back, as
a free and open space (made up of the truth, which Heidegger calls region or
“county”).
To conclude, the inauguration
is the same hermeneutic process when, hermeneutic means the reading and the
interpretation of the horizons of truth through individual means. The
hermeneutical function of art is, to be the space, or the playing field, or the
group of processes which makes possible and facilitates de construction of new
manifestations of truth.
Generative art as an
"open work"
Coming to the end of this
short and synthetic journey inside the concept of esthetics, it is possible to
identify as a first conclusion, the need to manage some theoretical fundaments
to form an esthetic base which will allow us to avoid self referential and
contradictory mechanisms such as art for art’s sake.
These preconceptions are, on
the other hand, recognizable strategies in many manifestations of contemporary
art, especially in music and in literature. Umberto Eco[8] calls these factors
“the undetermined character of contemporary art”. The concept of “open work of
art” synthesizes the profile of work we are looking for. The operative scope of the open work
acquires a greater importance in the context of the new technologies.
Generative art, software art and in a general sense digital art, present us
with implicit links very much in the realm of the open work which we are about
to present.
1. Art is presented
essentially as a process and an event. This means that the work of art is not
made up of a result or a finished piece in itself, much less that the artistic
willingness is the condition which will determine, a priori, the artistic
nature of an object.
2. Art, understood as a
hermeneutic process, is of an emerging nature, always intrinsically destined to
manifesting itself through different forms. These concrete results are
phenomena which can be considered parallel to the creative endeavor of art as a
process.
3. The staging of truthful
contents in the execution of the work of art is essentially an interactive
process which involves the artist, work and public (Gadamer) or the
interactions of locality and county (Heidegger).
4. This interactive process
demands the participant’s total compromise: they are the artist’s “hic et nunc”
and of the spectator which as active part through the work of art, allow the
contact with the truth. The hermeneutic process fulfilled by the work of art is
possible if the process is transparent and if this process is not contaminated
by self interests or deceit.
5. The work of art’s opening
night as an opening to the horizon of truth (Heidegger), needs a common space
and a context of shared knowledge, which is mediated by the work of art on the
background made up of the truth. This shared space is also present in the game
(the knowledge of the game’s rules and objectives), and in the concept of aura
like “hic et nunc”.
Working along these
parameters, generative art is made up of a complex and interactive hermeneutic
system whose components are the artist, the spectator the know-how (mainly
scientific but essentially multidisciplinary) the software and the computer. We
must now ask ourselves if within the digital media so far described, we can
find the hermeneutical concepts so far described. I will try and demonstrate,
as a final step, that the critical factors and the elements which make up any interactive
process are knowledge and the interface.
The game of interaction
To start off with, by
interaction we understand a process which evidently cannot be reduced to its
functional and operative functions. On the contrary, interaction is a complex
intercultural process which must be developed in a free and democratic context,
a context in which the components interact, share knowledge and different
experiences in a balanced way. This exchange constitutes the profound quality
of a work of art which is truly created through an open hermeneutic process.
In this sense, the problem of
knowledge is of primary importance. In effect, I believe that a system can be
called interactive only if there exists a minimum balance of knowledge among
the parts. If one of these is at a disadvantage as regards know-how with the
rest, then the interaction can transform itself into manipulation, and end up
an exercise in power which will always be imposed on the weakest member.
Following along these lines,
true interaction involves the creation of balanced knowledge when this is
absent beforehand. The need to democratize art is demanded creating the
pedagogic space of shared knowledge.
The real problem consists now
in determining if in the computer’s nature, the software’s and the interface’s
the necessary conditions exist for the development of real interactivity. And
finally of course, we must examine what kinds of problems these elements
present to the open artistic practice.
Hardware, software and
knowledge
Firstly when we talk about the
computer, there seems to be some confusion regarding its nature, at least in
the artistic and teaching environments in Latin America. In these contexts and
probably due to the lack of technological culture, the nature of the computer
is never questioned: it is simply accepted and used as a tool, from within
consumerist habits which worsen the less people manage technological know how.
The first mistake consists in
viewing computers as machines. This error limits the nature of computers implicitly
to hardware, leaving in the background its true essence which lies with the
software.
This seemingly lexical error
leaves users exposed and unprotected to the software’s cultural mechanisms.
Furthermore, this way we equivocally begin to view the computer as a stable
entity, which can be regulated precisely (like a machine). I feel it is
important to always remember that that a computer is a complex system which
manifests itself in vastly different ways, as different as the surroundings of
the software which conform it.
The intelligence of the
computer is to be found in the software. Without wanting to delve in the issue
of artificial intelligence too much, I think we should stress the fact that any
software is a potpourri of cultural inputs, strategies and ideas, which make up
the operational means with which this software has been designed to interact
with its users.
As Inke Arns has recently pointed out: "Today, in a time when our
environment gets increasingly mediatized and digitized and thus can be said to
be based increasingly on software, it becomes more and more important to be
aware that code or software directly affects the virtual and actual spaces in
which we are moving, communicating and living. It has the capabilities to
directly mobilize or immobilize its users".[9]
Software viewed this way,
cannot be considered a tool because it becomes language, text, a communication
process. It is now clear that we must recover from the interior of this
communication process, the identity and the knowledge as these concepts have
become the key to the hermeneutic interactive process (the work of art).
1. The Identity. When we
interact with a piece of software, we are really establishing contact with an
unknown (a “hic et nunc”) identity; but we could say, to a certain point, that
our identity is known by the software: it knows what we are after and it is
designed so that we can do things with it. Furthermore, we as users, do not
know how the software does things nor why nor in what mode. It is in this manner
that we adapt to its mechanisms, trying to optimize our productive capacity to
its possibilities. To use software means to interact with a cultural and
communications system which acts and operates autonomously on the user often
before the user knows what to do with it.
2. The Knowledge. This aspect
has become increasingly important due to the growing functional automation and
operating capacity of applied programs. As it stands, this capacity feeds on a
vast wealth of knowledge embedded in the algorithms and in the programs’ code.
This knowledge is not accessible to the user, who can only make use of it
operatively and such limited interactive experiences will never constitute a
real exchange of knowledge. On the contrary, the use of alien knowledge drastically
reduces personal capacity. The computer, more than being just a tool for
cerebral expansion, becomes a tool for its debilitation.
Simulation and knowledge
These problems present
themselves amplified when the communications process user/software has as a
goal, artistic production, like in the case of generative art or software art.
In many cases, these systems make abundant use of advanced scientific know how
like it is the case with artificial life, genetics, the simulation of processes
of evolution and others. However fascinating it might be, the introduction of
this know how, makes for the imbalance in knowledge between software and its
users to grow progressively. And so the necessary conditions for hermeneutic
development become increasingly difficult to attain. In imbalanced conditions
we cannot speak about a really open interactive process. This presents us with
the risk of having the generative process reduced to a mere spectacle, to an
aesthetic object for momentary enjoyment, but which does not leave its mark or
an ontological increment in the artist or the spectator/user.
In other words, these systems
can easily become self referential circuits which lack real compromise with the
spectator. It is in this case that we can say that we still belong to the same
aesthetic horizon of art for art’s sake.
This is the reason why serious
digital artists generally write and create their own software tools, but this
operation which solves the problem at author level, leaves pending
problematically the aspect concerning the spectator and his interaction with
the digital work of art.
I feel that it is at this
point that we address the conclusive problem of interface, as it is the medium
which makes possible the interaction between author, software as motor of the
generative work of art and the spectator.
The interface
Let us examine the interface.
Its main function consists of facilitating the operative interaction between
user and software. This way, the interface seems an innocent, purely functional
tool. It is for this reason it has often been said that the most effective
interface design is that which is oriented around the user. Nobody wants to
question from this point of view its usefulness; however this function implies
a series of consequences which in effect constitute a real hermeneutical
problem.
In the first place, as regards
design, the interface becomes a language which links the user with the software
code. But in reality, this design serves a dual purpose: the first must surely
be the facilitation of the user’s task, but the second consists implicitly of
hiding behind some kind of visual metaphor, the software’s know how and
architecture.
Secondly and taking into
consideration what has just been said, we could state that interface design
reflects, to a certain extent, the software’s view point. This statement which
might seem absurd, I believe is justified, as the interface relies on the
software’s functional architecture to function. It reflects therefore the
software’s capacity, not the users: the interface intervenes between the
infinite operative possibilities that users demand and the limited functions of
the software.
If we analyze the interface
through the methodological context of the game, it appears as a mask, because
it hides the software’s true identity. It is in this way that in the game of
interaction, a subtle manipulative element is introduced, which induces the
user to perceive software as a simple tool and to feel the he operates in a
free and creative environment. This illusion is strongest the more the
interface is presented as a technological apparatus and stage design: the
visual metaphors (like 3D virtual reality) distract the user through the
special effects show.
Following this philosophy,
when dealing with artistically generative processes, the interface and software
can weaken the hermeneutical potential of the artistic process. They can also
weaken the specific cultural contributions of the multidisciplinary know how
used inside their processes: theories and innovative principles like complex
systems, self replicating systems or artificial life, transform themselves into
a scientific visualization show leaving the generative work of art continually
trapped in the logic of art for art’s sake.
An open conclusion
Through these writings I have
attempted to reflect upon generative art, confronting aesthetic principles and
the structures of interactive digital systems. We have seen the surfacing of
methodological problems which difficult the development of the generative art process,
a process which I have tried to view through the lens of postmodernity,
specially in its hermeneutic aspects. Following these principles, the
conclusions we can draw present themselves as simple proposals and open work
hypothesis.
Initially we find ourselves having
to think in a different way, having to redefine the objectives of software’s
within generative processes. Software must assume its socially responsible
role, recognizing and dealing with its identity of cultural system and system
of communication.
We should then focus our attention
on new ways to manage the problems brought forward by knowledge, of its
balanced distribution and communication inside interactive systems.
I also believe that the concept of
interface design should be redefined. It should strengthen the hermeneutic
process like cultural and knowledge interchanges in generative systems and
digital art in general. Interfaces should, in my opinion, abandon the logic of
becoming techno gadgets as well as the use of special effects.
Finally, I think we can try and
address the issue of isolating validation criteria, presented at the beginning
as a crucial aspect of generative art regarding technological and interactive
art. I believe these criteria cannot be based on the subjective artistic
evaluation of the formal results of the generative process. The quality of the
work of art (not only generative) could be interpreted by evaluating the
efficiency of the hermeneutic process. In other words we should evaluate the
work of art’s capacity to create a system which, through the distribution of
knowledge and beauty, would cater for the development of individual and social
creative potentials.
References
[1]
Galanter, Philip. What is Generative Art? Complexity Theory as a Context for
Art Theory, in: Generative Art Proceedings, Milano 2003
[2]
Negroponte, Nicholas. Being Digital. New York: Knopf, 1995
[3] Baudrillard, Jean. Il delitto perfetto. La televisione ha ucciso la realtá?. Milano: Raffaello Cortina Editore,
1996
[4] Danto, Arthur C. Después del fin del Arte. Barcelona: Paidós, 1999
[5]
Benjamin, Walter. The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. In
Illusions, New York: Schoken, 1969
[6]
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Veritá e metodo. A cura di Gianni Vattimo. Milano:
Bompiani, 2000
[7] Heidegger, Martin. L'arte e lo
spazio. Introduzione di Gianni Vattimo. Genova: il nuovo melagolo, 2000
[8] Eco, Umberto. Opera aperta.
Milano: RCS Libri, 2000
[9]
Arns, Inke. Read_me, run_me, execute_me: Some notes about software art. Lecture
at kuda, Novi Sad, April 9, 2004.